Global oil demand will rise a few MM b/d to 2030, peak, then quickly fall in 2 of 3 scenarios. My money's on the middle scenario.

Big picture: road transport falls b/c EVs, petchem/aviation rise but not enough to offset the decline.

This is consistent w/my expert interviews.

13 sectors that rely on oil will face a more complex transition than expected just a couple of years ago.

Substituting capital stock (oil consumption) will be complex and lengthy due to competitive advantages of oil in multiple transportation sectors and industrial processes.

Oil demand will rise further in the medium term as low-carbon alternatives  not yet sufficiently developed/economically competitive to offset growing demand for transportation, industrial services.

Demand remains "sticky."

Oil demand revised higher in all three scenarios on stronger petchem assumptions 

Increasing equilibrium oil prices in all scenarios in the long-term

Fast shift to EV quickly alters vehicle and trucks fleet, reducing oil demand in Mean

Speed bumps:
*lack of mass-market EVs outside of China
*poor charging infrastructure
*low consumer acceptance in some regions
*charging insecurity
*withdrawal of subsidies in some countries.

Petrochemicals is the largest driver of global oil demand growth in next 2.5 decades

Demand for plastics is set to surge b/c expanding global middle class.

Oil and natural gas liquids (NGLs) will be feedstock used to produce plastic.

Recycling only 8% of plastic consumption.

Maritime shipping requires a fuel with high energy density, safe storage and transport and a well-established supply chain. 

Alternatives like ammonia and methanol may satisfy some of these requirements, but they are not yet competitive.

Aviation still lags, but alternative fuel demand is promising.

Sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) has potential to grow significantly during the 2030s and beyond, it will not significantly impact aviation in the next 5 years.

Between now and 2050, the oil industry will need to produce:

*700 billion under 2.2°C scenario
*550+ billion barrels under 1.9°C scenario
*440 billion under 1.6°C scenario 

Shifts in product demand to drive significant changes in refining landscape.

Demand for traditional products is decreasing, while the need for petrochemical feedstocks like naphtha and liquified petroleum gas (LPG) is rising.

Global Oil Demand Shift: The Road Ahead

Highlights from International Energy Agency's (IEA) 2024 Renewables report.

https://www.iea.org/news/massive-global-growth-of-renewables-to-2030-is-set-to-match-entire-power-capacity-of-major-economies-today-moving-world-closer-to-tripling-goal

Global distributed solar PV additions (inc. residential, commercial and industrial) grew over 60% in 2023, mostly owing to acceleration in China and Europe.

China’s record was truly exceptional, accounting on its own for 2/3
of global annual additions. In 2023, the country’s solar PV additions grew
2.5x and wind installations more than 2x.

US registered 2nd-largest increase, nearly 2x utility PV installations from 2022 to 2023.

Rapid utility-scale wind, solar PV growth has increased grid integration challenges. 

In Q1 2024, China's curtailment rates for variable renewable energy generation, increased, although they remained below 3% for both technologies.

Global renewable capacity additions rise to ~935 GW in 2030. Solar PV, wind are account for 95% of all capacity additions through 2030 b/c generation costs are lower than for both fossil and non-fossil alternatives in most countries, and policies continue to support them.

Electricity continues to make up only a small share of total, with global
consumption accounting for 23% in 2030, up just 4 percentage points from 2023.

Over 2024-2030, China is expected to install 3,207 GW of new renewable
electricity capacity, more than tripling growth of 2017-2023. 

Since 2015, China’s share in global annual capacity additions has been increasing and is expected to reach almost 60% in 2030.

EU remains the 2nd-largest growth market, with annual additions continuing to increase through 2030.

US 2x over 2024-2030, driven by govt subsidies.

India increases more quickly than any other major economy.

Africa underperforms considering its potential, electrification needs

In the electricity sector, the renewable energy share is forecast to expand from 30% in 2023 to 46% in 2030. Solar and wind make up almost all this growth.

In 2030, variable renewables account for 2/3 of global renewable electricity generation (from less than 45% today). Over the forecast period, the share of solar PV in meeting global power demand 3x while wind almost 2x and the role of hydropower becomes less prominent.

China = 2x renewables by 2030. Wind, solar PV costs on par with or just below coal-fired generation depending on provinces. 

Europe, US will account for ~30% of global renewable power generation in 2030, followed by Brazil, India (5 % each). India’s share more than doubles,

In US, Europe, China, renewable electricity makes up most new renewable transport demand, as EV stocks expand, powered by growing shares of renewable electricity.

Current renewable energy demand forecasts for the road, marine and aviation subsectors fall short of the IEA Net Zero by 2050 Scenario trajectory. Among these, road transport is the closest to meeting the scenario’s targets.

Heat pumps continue to gain ground over fossil fuel boilers in Europe.

Lower 2023 sales in US, Europe, Japan only partly offset by 12% growth in China (the largest market).

Industrial heat consumption is projected to grow 17% (+20 EJ) by 2030, with China and India accounting for over 50% of the increase. Renewable heat will represent less than half of this growth, with its share in industrial heat supply slowly increasing to 16%.

Accelerated case assumes govts address key policy, grid integration, financing, permitting challenges in short term to unlock ~20% more capacity compared with the main case, enabling an ~3x global renewable capacity by 2030.

Main-case: 69 of 150 countries reach or surpass existing policy goals for renewable capacity; these countries hold almost 80% of cumulative capacity today. 

Most countries expected to fall short of ambitions, but they account for only 15% of our forecast.

China's wind, solar PV developers being offered 15-20 year power purchase contracts at set prices, defined mostly by existing coal-fired
generation. 

Since discontinuation of feed-in-tariff policy in 2020, China’s solar
PV capacity additions nearly tripled to 261 GW in 2023.

US forecast to add nearly 500 GW of renewables  capacity
over 2024-2030, almost all in solar PV, wind installations.

IRA is continuing to drive expansion, inc. (along with state- and utility-level incentives) distributed solar PV growth.

Distributed solar PV leads European growth and is set to become the technology with the most installed renewable capacity by 2026 surpassing hydropower and onshore wind. 

Policy drivers underpin this expansion.

Renewable energy capacity in Asia Pacific (excluding China) is expected to
expand more than 680 GW in 2024-2030, doubling 2017-2023 growth. 

Total installed renewable capacity in the region increases by a factor of 2.2,

Latin America will add over 190 GW of renewable capacity, led by solar PV (72%) wind power (19%) and hydropower (5%). 

5 countries = 92% of additions
*Brazil (58%)
*Chile (14%)
*Mexico (10%)
*Colombia (6%)
*Argentina (4%).

Capacity triples from 53 GW in 2023 to ~150 GW in 2030. 

Solar PV = 85%

Good solar resources, economies of scale, beneficial land/financing costs, the region continues to produce winning bids at the lower end of the world’s awarded bid range.

~90 GW of new Sub-Saharan Africa's renewable capacity 2024 to 2030 (2.5x increase).

*South Africa = 40% of region’s new capacity

Outside of South Africa, hydropower makes up the majority of total additions:
*Ethiopia (7.3 GW)
*Tanzania (3.3 GW)
*Angola (2.6 GW) 

Renewable energy technologies increasingly cost-competitive, but
policies remain key.

84% of global renewable utility-scale capacity growth in 2024-2030 is
expected to be stimulated by policy schemes, a share similar to last year’s
forecast.

Key Findings from IEA's 2024 Renewables Report

Batteries and Secure Energy Transitions: World Energy Outlook Special Report, International Energy Agency
https://www.iea.org/reports/batteries-and-secure-energy-transitions

Batteries and the Energy Transition

Source: ElectricVehicleOutlook2024, BloombergNEF

Global Electric Vehicle Sales Analysis

Share of electricity production by source

Share of electricity production by source - World, countries

Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2023

International Renewable Energy 
https://www.irena.org/Publications/2024/Sep/Renewable-Power-Generation-Costs-in-2023

Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2023

1/🧵Came across some old USA data that shows rise of new energy technology (ICE tractors + petroleum) and decline of old (animal power).

Smooth lines disguise plenty of market speed bumps, eg Great Depression starts in 1930.

Don't fret about EV sales.  EVs = tractors
#Alberta

2/The first "tractors" were powered by steam. They date back to the early 1890s.

In Western Canada, they were uneconomic for plowing, but very good at breaking new farm land and powering the big threshing machines that toured farms during harvest.

Sales declined in 1920s.

3/Around 1908, first "big gas tractors" sold in the West.

Still uneconomic for 1/4 section farms, a few big commercial farms experimented with teams of them. Economics weren't much better than steam tractors.

Never caught on. Kinda like some of the early EVs that failed.

4/This is the tractor that in 1918 changed everything.

Henry Ford's "Fordson" was small, affordable ($600USD if I remember correctly), well designed and built (used auto technology).

For the first time, a tractor competed with horses for plowing cost per acre.

5/1920s farmers didn't know much about tractors, so the USaskatchewan held "tractor schools" on farms across the province.

Profs AE Hardy and Grieg helped many early adopters successfully integrate "power farming" into their operations.

6/"Combined threshers" were another important tech milestone.

They were crude, unreliable, and expensive, but they lowered the cost of threshing per bushel by freeing farmers from contract threshers.

Many a bumper crop was lost b/c of rain or snow waiting for a threshing crew.

7/Important innovations during the 1930s sped up adoption.

Rubber tires arrived in the early 1930s.

Can you imagine how awful it was to ride a tractor all day with steel paddles welded to steel wheels?

8/Plenty of smaller, forgotten innovations from the 30s and 40s made tractors and combines ever more efficient.

One of the most important was the 3-point hitch and hydraulics, which made hitching implements to the tractor so much easier and safer.

9/Jump ahead to the 2020s, a 100 years later.

Tractors cost north of $300,000 and they look like this behemoth.

My wife's cousin farms 3,000 acres near Nipawin almost by himself, just a bit of family and hired help at harvest.

Behold the future of EVs.

Tech Adoption S-curve: Old Tractors, Modern EVs

1/🧵The Death of King Oil

Will global oil demand peak in 2030 then decline quickly @IEA or peak in 2045 and decline slowly @OPEC?

The answer has significant implications for #Canada and oil-producing provinces, especially #Alberta.
#OOTT #ABleg #cdnpoli
https://share.transistor.fm/s/72e05025


2/Framing the peak oil demand discussion: Fast vs slow energy transition

International Energy Agency (IEA) = fast
*Peak oil demand by 2030, short plateau, rapid decline in 2 of 3 scenarios

OPEC = slow
*Peak oil demand in 2045, long plateau, slow decline
https://energi.media/energi-notes/world-petroleum-congress-fighting-to-redefine-energy-transition-on-its-terms/

3/My hypothesis: IEA's modelling and analysis is more credible than OPEC's.

Several of OPEC's key assumptions (discussed later in this thread) are falling apart only a few months after the release of World Oil Outlook 2045.
https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/7225.htm

4/If anything, IEA studies have historically UNDER-ESTIMATED the pace of the energy transition.

Other analysts have said the energy transition is accelerating so rapidly they revise forecasts multiples during a year.

Conclusion: Fast transition transition is more likely.

5/IEA's World Energy Outlook 2023 is my main source, but I also rely heavily on excellent analysis from @colinmckerrache's BloomberNEF team + my many expert interviews about the topic.

The IEA has also released many thorough energy transition studies about more specific topics.

6/In 2017 I interviewed a @WoodMackenzie economist who said oil companies are most concerned about the shape of the oil demand decline curve rather than timing of peak demand.

IEA modellers think decline curves will be steep in APS, NZE scenarios.

7/IEA scenarios:

STEPS: No new policies
*Business as usual

APS: govts follow through on announced policies
*Significant change to global energy system, but not enough to achieve 1.5C global temp rise target

NZE: net-zero emissions
*Achieves 1.5C
https://share.transistor.fm/s/3fe52c5f

8/Predicting the future is impossible, but here's my handicapping of the IEA scenarios:

STEPS: unlikely. EVs already destroying oil demand.

APS: most likely.

NZE: unlikely, but possible, according to current experts.
https://share.transistor.fm/s/e11b2525

9/Rapid rise in EV sales (up 38% 2023)  will have the most impact on oil demand between now and 2050.

IEA is now calling for peak oil demand in road transport by 2030 in all scenarios.

In APS scenario, demand falls a small amount by 2030, much more by 2050.

Source: WEO 2023

10/BNEF's Economic Transition Scenario roughly mirrors that of IEA's APS scenario.

BNEF is forecasting peak oil demand from road transport in 2027, just 3-4 years away.

Demand decline begins in the early 2030s.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-08/ev-sales-are-soaring-and-oil-use-is-about-to-peak-hyperdrive?sref=2P50Jwox

11/OPEC's World Oil Output 2045 models oil demand to rise in two scenarios and to decline only marginally in the other.

These are radically different scenarios than the IEA.

12/Why is difference between IEA, OPEC so important?

*Alberta govt endorses OPEC's assumptions, reflected in @ABdanielleSmith's Emissions Reduction + Energy Development Plan

*Canadian oil co.s use scenarios similar to OPEC's to make investment decisions.
https://energi.media/markham-on-energy/danielle-smith-has-an-oil-and-gas-marketing-plan-not-a-climate-plan/

13/Three unlikely WOO 2045 oil demand assumptions:

1. Clean energy tech like EVs not yet economic

2. Govts/citizens tired of climate policy costs, support softening

3. Emerging economies more than make up for decline in rich economies
*WOO 2045

14/Assumption #1:

Lower fuel, operating, maintenance costs = EVs compete well with ICE on total cost of ownership

ICE purchase price still higher, but automakers turning focus to lower-priced models.

China (now exporting) has huge lead in low to mid-range of EV market.
*BNEF

15/Assumption #2

COP28 undermines this assumption. Final agreement was iterative, not a "breakthrough," but signalled continued forward momentum on climate policy ambition.

Including "transitioning away from fossil fuels" language for first time was historic.

16/Assumption #3

This assumption has some legitimacy. Africa, in particular, is home to oil producers determined to develop their economies by exploiting significant oil/gas fields.

 But Asia, inc India, seems to be slowly pivoting to EVs.
*BNEF

17/Assumption #3 cont.

But there is still a long way to go. Most of the countries/regions where EVs comprise less than 10% of new vehicle sales are in Asia.

Note: 5%-10% of new sales is generally considered the "inflection point," where sales begin to grow exponentially.
*BNEF

18/Assumption #3 cont.

One sector where Asia has made considerable progress is electric 2/3-wheelers, which are most popular mode of transportation in most countries.

Again, China has a big lead but other countries are near or past the inflection point.

19/Assumption #3 cont.

2/3 wheelers have already avoided ~1 million b/d of oil demand.

Oil use avoided by total EVs has more than doubled since 2015

20/Biggest blow to OPEC's slow energy transition narrative came just a few months after WOO 2045 was released.

Sinopec, China's largest refiner, forecast that China would reach peak oil demand as early as 2026, no later than 2030.

OPEC forecast growth of 4 million b/d by 2045.

21/That's a quarter of the demand increase OPEC expected globally.

How did OPEC get it so wrong?

What other assumptions and forecasts will prove to be wrong?

China’s peak oil demand bombshell eviscerates Danielle Smith’s energy strategy
https://energi.media/markham-on-energy/chinas-peak-oil-demand-bombshell-eviscerates-danielle-smiths-energy-strategy/

22/China's now leads world by a wide margin in both manufacturing the clean energy technology and adopting it.

*IEA State of Clean Energy Manufacturing report 2023

23/China's clean energy manufacturing sector is so big that by 2030 it will have 3x more production capacity than is required to meet domestic demand.

That scale enables China to drive down prices, export in large volumes.
*IEA State of Clean Energy Manufacturing report 2023

24/China is poised to dominate global manufacturing of electric vehicles.

*Highest EV sales volume (8.3 million in 2023)
*Biggest EV manufacturing sector
*Controls 50%-80% of EV supply chains
*~600,000 e-buses in China
*40% of 2/3-wheelers now electric

25/China's lead in batteries is important b/c batteries make up 1/4 to 1/3 of EV cost.

Battery manufacturing capacity has increased 31% since 2022

BYD, now the world's biggest EV maker, began business as a battery manufacturer, giving it complete control of the supply chain.

26/Battery prices ticked up for first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic b/c of raw material shortages, but are falling again.

China has lowest prices: $126/kWh for passenger EVs, $100/kWh for buses.

EV makers are switching to even lower cost LFP and sodium-ion batteries.
*BNEF

27/Not only are batteries getting ever cheaper, but energy density (the amount of power that can be stored in the battery) is rising 7% per year.

That means more range, as this graphic demonstrates.

EVs drive for longer distances: average range for 2023 is 470 kilometres.
*BNEF

28/New BEVs can charge faster

Average max-charging power of a 2023 BEV  was 186 kilowatts (kW), 25% higher than 2022.

Some EV makers switching to 800-volt architectures that enable charging powers of 350kW and higher in future models.

Goal: 80% charge in 10-20 minutes
*BNEF

29/Cumulative global investment in EV charging approaches $100 billion

BNEF estimates for global chargers end of 2023:
*15.4 million home EV chargers
*4.1 million public chargers

% of total:
China: 69%
Europe: 17%
USA: 6%

30/Access to public charging is a major consideration for EV buyers.

2023 expected public charging investments:

China: $19 billion
Europe: $5.3 billion
US: $2.7 billion



31/In the latter part of 2023, news stories reported softening US interest in EVs (sales still rose 47% YoY).

Not enough (and poorly working) charging infrastructure/range anxiety is a big reason.

Other reasons included high interest rates, $13,000 price premium.

32/Policy has played an key role in the development and adoption of clean energy technologies like EVs.

Supply side: grow EV makers/supply chains until they can compete w/o subsidies

Demand side: subsidize EV purchases/support infrastructure until no longer required.

33/Global spending on clean road-transport vehicles/infrastructure:

From 2015 to 2022: $1.3 trillion

2023: as high as $685 billion

Asia Pacific, dominated by China = 50% of last year's spending.
*BNEF

34/Strong industrial strategies/policies have figured in the efforts of all regions/countries trying to build electric transportation industries.

35/Policy provides strong foundation for EV adoption in major car markets.

From 2010, China had generous subsidies, but has reduced them each year, fully eliminating some at the end of 2022.

36/Canada is a laggard in clean energy industrial policy.

Canada's policy has 3 parts:

1. Carbon tax
2. Regulations
3. Subsidies

Ontario, home of Canada's auto sector, has no real strategy or plan. Quebec has attracted battery plant investments.
https://share.transistor.fm/s/dce2ba14

37/Major automakers' investment plans highlight EV commitments.

But several have delayed capital spending over "soft demand."

Most are OEMs over-estimated their ability to switch to EV manufacturing.

Example: GM's problems with its new Ultium platform, software, etc.
*BNEF

38/China's EV demand running ahead of what govt regulations require.

39/COVID-19 pandemic made US realize how vulnerable it is to Chinese supply chains, especially clean energy technologies.

$369 billion Inflation Reduction Act expected to leverage $1.7 trillion of private capital in clean energy manufacturing by 2032
https://share.transistor.fm/s/0eda97b8

40/US EV/battery sector has been energized by Inflation Reduction Act, other federal and state legislation.

IRA funding restricted to US manufacturers and countries with which US has free trade agreement, like Canada and Mexico.

41/Inflation Reduction Act already attracted over $100 billion of EV investment in North America

42/Despite China's rapid growth in clean energy adoption and manufacturing, Europe is running a close second in many sectors.



43/European home charging companies are benefiting from high sales

44/EU’s plan to phase out ICE sales covers 13% of global auto market

45/ZEVs fuelled 2-wheeler market with 9% sales growth in 2022

46/ZEV bus sales slowing in China but rising elsewhere

47/Commercial ZEV adoption beginning to take off

48/Global EV sales growth is unevenly distributed

49/Combustion vehicle sales have already peaked.

*BNEF

50/Almost 41 million 4-wheeled passenger EVs on the road.

51/Forecasters consistently under-estimate growth of zero-emissions vehicles.
*BNEF

52/ZEVs are now expected to take more market share, sooner.

*BNEF

54/Alberta Premier @ABDanielleSmith, Saskatchewan @PremierScottMoe, Canadian oil CEOs are committed to OPEC's slow transition modelling.

Govts are committing tens of billions to continued growth of oil/gas industry.
https://energi.media/markham-on-energy/albertas-political-business-elites-have-misread-the-global-energy-transition/

55/If OPEC is wrong and the IEA is correct, then AB, SK, and Canada have made poor decisions with significant implications for citizens, taxpayers, workers, and businesses.

Alberta = $300 billion of unfunded O&G liabilities.

Who will pay for clean up?
https://energi.media/markham-on-energy/unethical-oil-and-the-regulator-albertas-shameful-secret/

56/Canadian Energy Regulator's Energy Futures 2023 report models net-zero scenario for first time.

Policy costs may make some producers uncompetitive, leading to oil company failures.

Could all or most of govt subsidies be lost?
https://share.transistor.fm/s/3fe52c5f

57/Canadian oil/gas sector has already lost 51,600 jobs in past 10 years.

2014 = 229,000

2023 = 177,400

Alberta jobs losses during that period: 42,000
*careersinenergy.ca

58/2020 EY study suggests another 40,000 to 50,000 will be lost by 2040, if not sooner, due to automation and new digital technologies like AI.

https://youtu.be/v8soHTp81m0

59/The evidence in this thread suggests that the future of the global energy system is much more likely to resemble IEA's fast energy transition case than OPEC's slow energy transition case.

OPEC's case is at the heart of Alberta energy/climate policy.
https://energi.media/markham-on-energy/chinas-peak-oil-demand-bombshell-eviscerates-danielle-smiths-energy-strategy/

60/Oil companies, almost all of them headquartered in Alberta, mostly favour the OPEC view of the energy future.

Canada leans more toward the IEA fast energy transition case, but too often is stymied or swayed by Alberta.
https://energi.media/markham-on-energy/slow-walking-the-energy-transition-a-mistake-for-alberta-oil-patch/

61/Premier Danielle Smith told me at a press conference that there is no Plan B.

Then, if the IEA is right, as appears likely, Alberta and Canada are very poorly prepared for the death of King Oil.

The economic, financial, and environmental consequences could be catastrophic.

The Death of King Oil: Fast vs Slow Energy Transition

1/🧵 about new @IEA energy employment report.

*Clean energy investment up 40% over past 2 yrs
*67 million(MM) energy workers globally
*Clean energy = 35MM
*Fossil fuels = 32MM
* #China has most clean energy workers
* #Cleanenergy skilled labour shortages
https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/8934984a-0d66-444f-a36f-641a4a3ef7de/World_Energy_Employment_2023.pdf

2/Most oil/gas jobs lost during pandemic didn't come back.

#Alberta lost 20,000 O&G jobs since 2019.

"A major shift in energy employment worldwide has been underway since the pandemic, with growth coming almost entirely from clean energy jobs in 2019-2022."
#ABleg #yyc #yeg

3/"Oil and gas investments have rebounded amid the crisis, but the pace of re-hiring remained tempered by uncertainty regarding long-term demand prospects in light of increasing climate action. "

Digital tech destroys jobs in O&G, creates jobs in clean energy.

4/"Clean energy is the primary driver of worldwide energy employment growth – and only in a few regions are fossil fuel jobs higher than pre-pandemic levels."

North America gained few clean energy jobs, but lost fossil fuels jobs. Should change with Inflation Reduction Act.

5/Canadians don't appreciate how Asia generally, China specifically  dominates clean energy industrial revolution.

China now drives the energy transition. USA is desperately trying to catch up, but is far behind. The EU is trying to adjust to the IRA.

Global energy arms race.

6/These are the clean energy industries/supply chains China dominates.

Canada ranks 4th in oil, 5th in gas in global production. 70-80% comes from Alberta.

Canada a leader in 20th century energy, laggard in 21st century energy.

7/More evidence of China's lead in clean energy deployment (wind, solar) and clean energy industry (solar panels, wind turbines, EVs manufacturing, batteries, heat pumps, etc).

Heavy investments in clean energy over past 20+ years give China the jobs lead by wide margin.

8/Climate policy isn't just about lowering greenhouse gas emissions.

USA is very clear about importance of industrial policy to subsidize adoption of clean energy tech (eg solar) AND building industry to manufacture that tech.

Basically, what China began c. 2000.

9/This should be Alberta's mantra:

*Mitigate risk to existing energy sector

*Take every possible advantage of opportunities in clean energy deployment and industry

10/"...vocational roles such as construction may require greater specialisation than in other industries, parlaying into higher pay. This wage gap acts as a barrier to shifting workers from oil and gas to clean energy sectors, especially for late-career workers."

AB issue?

11/Question: Since Canada's grid is already 84% zero emissions, are we better off creating new energy jobs in clean energy R&D, manufacturing, supply chains etc?

Easy answer is both, but there is much to do and not much time to do it, suggesting Canada should focus its efforts.

12/"In some fossil fuel industries, workers already possess skillsets that
can be highly applicable to other sectors...O&G workers, for example, tend to have skills needed in bioenergy processing, carbon capture, utilisation and storage, hydrogen production, and geothermal."

13/"...energy sector requires more highly skilled, specialised energy
workers than many other industries, with 36% of the energy workforce typically requiring some form of tertiary education, and 51% some vocational training..."

14/Big problem in Canada.

"...despite recognition that [vocational education training] will be critical to the green transition, these programmes are not expanding fast enough to meet the growing demand in the energy industry."

15/"...changes in employment ushered in by the clean energy
transition need to be carefully managed to minimise the social
costs, maintain social license, and ensure labour does not become
a bottleneck for transition."

Making transitions just for workers increasingly important.

16/Big Alberta issue. Hear this all the time from workers used to making $100,000-plus on a rig.

Those jobs are disappearing fast thanks to digital tech, automation, etc.

17/"Women have historically been underrepresented in the energy
world. With net growth in energy employment exclusively in the
clean energy sector through 2030, the transition offers an opportunity to redress this trend with more inclusive policies, at both company, govt levels."

18/This report is more evidence of how far behind Canada is in pivoting to the energy transition.

Hot take of the day: let's downplay the climate angle of the transition for a bit and focus on the economic one.

Like the Americans.



19/Between Inflation Reduction Act, Infrastructure Act, other legislation the US govt will provide around $1 trillion of support to energy transition by early 2030s.

Will Canada invest in clean energy industry and create jobs or watch others do it while O&G jobs disappear?

New IEA report Global Energy Employment Trends and Clean Energy Investment

🧵 about @ABDanielleSmith's 7-month moratorium on new wind, solar projects.

Move roundly condemned by economists, clean energy groups.

The criticism is deserved, but there's more to this story, IMO.
#ABleg #ABpoli
https://www.alberta.ca/release.cfm?xID=887605547987E-EABF-5E23-DFF2C9F72DB845E6

2/Min @neudorf_ab says moratorium a response to AB Utilities Commission (AUC) July 21 letter that raised 2 issues:

1. "development of power plants on high value agricultural lands"

2. "lack of mandatory reclamation security requirements for power plants"
https://www.alberta.ca/external/news/AUC-Letter-to-Minister-Neudorf-July-21-2023.pdf

3/AB Electricity System Operator (AESO) also wrote a letter dated July 21 that supported "an inquiry into land use and reclamation issues..."
https://www.alberta.ca/external/news/AESO-Letter-to-Minister-Neudorf-July-21-2023.pdf


4/And Paul McLauchlin, president, Rural Municipalities of AB (RMA), endorsed the moratorium, saying RM "voices must be included in the approval process for all renewable energy projects.

Are these concerns legitimate? Might there be other issues lurking in the wings?

5/Are Smith/UCP anti-wind/solar?

"We are a natural gas province and we will continue to build natural gas power plants because that is what makes sense in Alberta," she told RMA convention in March.

Cf, Emissions Reduction & Energy Development Plan,
https://energi.media/markham-on-energy/danielle-smith-has-an-oil-and-gas-marketing-plan-not-a-climate-plan/

6/What about posting of surety bonds to ensure funds for reclamation by wind/solar farm developers?

The irony is thick.

AB regulators rejected full-reclamation cost bonds for wells 100 years ago and eliminated ALL security in 1986.
https://energi.media/unethical-oil/unethical-oil-part-2-albertas-orphan-well-crisis/

7/Could concerns have been addressed without a moratorium?

UCP in power 4+ years, RMs have raised issues before, plenty of opportunity to act before now.

Never under-estimate UCP incompetence.

The Keystone Kops of provincial govts.
https://energi.media/markham-on-energy/ucp-is-the-worst-energy-government-in-albertas-history/

8) Are their solutions?

Agrivoltaics has been around for 40 years.

Does Alberta really need to bring industry growth to a screeching halt to figure out how livestock/grains can co-exist with wind and solar?

It's science, but not rocket science.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agrivoltaics

9/Solar panels recycling is a thing. Wind turbine recycling, also a thing.

Again, did AB really need a moratorium while ABGov devised a policy to ensure that recycling takes place?

Did it pause oil/gas development while crafting 2022 reclamation policies?

Not on your life.

10/The moratorium "is in direct response to a letter received from the AUC."

Critics point out that pausing development could jeopardize AB's reputation with investors and cause $25 billion of projects to be cancelled.

Hmm, what motivated the AUC to make such a drastic request?

11/The AUC says that its "case-by-case application process for new power plants is ill-suited to address these broad policy changes (farming land use, reclamation)."

Okaaay, but, yet again, did the need for new policy justify a moratorium?

Or is something else going on?

12/Since you asked:

"...higher monthly utility bills are causing customers to begin questioning the value of grid-provided service and, in still small but growing numbers, to begin looking for alternative means of obtaining electricity.

13/"Wind/solar/batteries "creating new avenues for customers to potentially bypass utility service and the associated tariff charges...raises questions about future viability of electric utilities and the role of regulation during a period of significant industry transformation."

14/Basically, big commercial, industrial customers can use wind/solar to generate their own power, disconnect from the grid, sticking remaining customers (read, utilities) with really high costs.

*Quotes are from "Distribution System Inquiry Final Report," AUC, 2021.

15/You can imagine how alarmed utilities and AESO (which might explain the system operator's letter supporting the moratorium) are watching AB add 1 GW of wind/solar last year, 2 GW planned for 2023, and plenty of projects in the queue.

16/Imagine the disruption to the power sector status quo.

More importantly, imagine the potential to damage natural gas demand from the AB power sector!

Who are Smith's biggest supporters? Small and medium-sized gas producers.

17/I can't draw a straight line yet between concerns raised in the 2021 AUC report and the moratorium, but I'll settle for a dotted line in the meantime.

It would go a long way to explaining why a seemingly easy problem to solve has suddenly emerged from left field.