Amazon and the FTC have both moved for summary judgment in the Prime “dark patterns” case headed to trial this fall. Amazon is seeking dismissal, the FTC seeking liability.

After nearly 2 years of discovery, the evidence doesn’t support the FTC’s headline-grabbing claims.

According to the FTC, AMZ "tricked and trapped" users into Prime memberships. But here's the catch: Prime requires affirmative user action. No one is passively enrolled.

That alone undermines the FTC’s entire theory under ROSCA: a law meant for negative enrollments.

Under ROSCA, a “negative option feature” exists when a customer is charged unless they take action to cancel. AMZ notes that Prime requires clear user consent, not passive enrollment, and therefore falls outside the statute’s scope.

The FTC points to interface labels like “Free Two-Day Shipping” and a multi-step cancellation process it dubs the “Iliad” as evidence of deception.

But AMZ offered evidence showing that more than 96% of users are able to cancel in under 90 seconds.

Even if ROSCA did apply, AMZ says the FTC can’t prove violations. The company clearly discloses:

-Price
-Renewal terms
-Cancellation rights

These appear in bold text, adjacent to the sign-up button.

The FTC’s own corporate representative & expert admitted that AMZ's disclosures were understandable.

Courts have also repeatedly upheld similar flows as compliant.

AMZ raises First Amendment concerns as well. 

The FTC’s attempt to restrict Prime-related messaging highlighting benefits during cancellation amounts to a ban on truthful commercial speech.

Trying to ban truthful commercial speech because it might persuade users to stay? 

That’s not protecting consumers, it’s patronizing them.

This is the case where the FTC is seeking to hold 3 AMZ executives personally liable for potentially over $1B in penalties, alleging that they were aware of the problems with accidental enrollments.

The individuals argue that their due process rights are being violated.

One exec being targeted wasn't even part of the Prime org until 2021, and the FTC's novel enforcement of ROSCA doesn't offer the fair notice needed that ROSCA bars the affirmative Prime enrollment process.

AMZ argues that the FTC’s case is a post hoc attempt to punish legitimate, widely used user experience design, without offering clear rules or precedent. 

This case isn’t about protecting consumers. It’s about expanding agency power.

Parties Move for Summary Judgment in FTC v. Amazon "Dark Patterns" case

On the second-to-last day of the search remedies trial, we finally talked about consumer welfare at length.

Kevin Murphy, another familiar face from the liability trial, was designated G's economics and industrial organization expert. 

He has only been involved in 2 remedy proceedings- this one and the MSFT case 20 years ago.

Judge Mehta: We've come full circle.

His first opinion was that the goal of sound remedies is to protect the competitive process from harm caused by conduct found to be anticompetitive, to promote consumer welfare.

Remedies should avoid restricting competition by:

- Artificially propping up rivals or hampering G
- Diminishing incentives to innovate, improve, and invest in products

The goal of remedies is not:

- Reshaping market features unrelated to conduct or harm
- Achieving policy goals by distorting the competitive process

They must stay tethered to the anticompetitive conduct and focus on consumer welfare.

Corrective Remedies:

✅ prohibit type of conduct found anticompetitive
✅ restore competition through the competitive process
✅ give rivals greater opportunity based on competition on merits
✅ can sufficiently restore competition without measuring harm from competition

Restorative Remedies:

⚠️ alter market outcomes by interfering with competitive process
⚠️ warranted only to extent conduct distorted market outcomes
⚠️ requires determining extent of distorted outcomes

Regulatory Interventions:

❌ engineer alternative market outcomes rather than remedy competitive process
❌ attempt to remove inherent entry barriers
❌ replace competitive process with regulatory mandates

Murphy testified that there needs to be a causal connection b/t past conduct and prospects for consumer welfare looking forward. When you have a causal connection, that tells you that something needs to be restored and to what extent.

You then tailor corresponding remedies to the extent.

In other words, think about the but-for-world.

If you go beyond the extent, you're in regulatory territory. Regulatory approaches seek to override what the market would have generated.

On cross, Murphy was confronted with the MSFT opinion, in which the court criticized his testimony about causal connection. 

One passage read: "The court harbors serious concern about the usefulness of Dr. Murphy's causation analysis... [the court] ascribes little, if any, weight to this portion of Dr. Murphy's testimony."

Judge Mehta asked how he should view the concept of the fruits of the anticompetitive conduct.

Murphy said the court needs to measure the impact of the conduct and consider how to achieve this to the extent possible, as long as it doesn't come at the expense of deterring future competition and harming consumers.

Mehta: how do you view the data sharing remedy?

Murphy: if it reduces what G can do for consumers, that is a pernicious outcomes. Rivals can build indexes tailored to their own product- that is competitive process. 

Customers benefit from unique products. Differentiation is an important part of the competitive process. That is lost if you shortcut the process.

On cross, the States pointed out that with open source Chromium, rivals have been able to differentiate in meaningful ways.

Edge is known for its AI and helper feats. 

A web browser doesn't need to be a copycat and can offer independent value.

Murphy testified that restorative remedies are justified when there is:

- a strong causal connection b/t anticompetitive conduct & market outcomes
- past distortion of market outcomes substantially impair competition going forward
- corrective remedies are insufficient

Even if these predicates are met, the benefits of restoring competition must outweigh the costs of interfering with the competitive process. 

In this case, the govt's remedies dont' pass muster. There is no evidence of a strong causal connection.

According to Murphy, a but-for world is one where G can compete for nonexclusive promotion.

There is no evidence that partners would have promoted rivals more absent the exclusivity provisions, nor would there be a material impact on market outcomes.

There's no basis for the DOJ's proposition that rivals would have "slowly chipped away" w/more scale.

- MSFT doubled its scale in 2010-> no meaningful quality/share improvement
- Yahoo won the FireFox default for 3 years-> failed to maintain its share

Murphy concluded that the goverment remedies violate sound economic principles:

- untethered to any measure of impact from conduct
- seek to terminate monopoly by hampering G & boosting rivals
- extensively intervene to alter inherent market features
- harm competitive process

The remedies hamper competition in all key dimensions:

- innovation and improving quality of search results
- supplying complements to search (browsers)
- promotion through partners based on quality/price

The government's "remedial world" bears no relation to the but-for-world, and actually saddles partners with a Hobson's choice:

Promote G without getting paid

or

Promote a lower quality/less preferred engine

This will force partners to increase the cost of supplying browsers/devices meaning lower quality or higher prices for consumers.

On the govt's self-preferencing & commingling remedies, Murphy said that product integrations are ubiquitous, provide user value, and a key part of the competitive process across many products/services.

The proposed prohibitions would harm competition, innovation, and consumers.

Murphy said G's ownership of Chrome and Chromium enhances browser competition. 

The DOJ's estimated share shift (3-7%) is minuscule in relation to the number of consumers the divestiture would harm.

Murphy said the goal of the States' public education fund is not to educate, but to seek a share shift. 

If the financial incentives it seeks to saddle G with were effective, one would have expected firms to have used them before. 

But such tools fail the market test.

In contrast, Murphy testified that G's remedies will restore competition through the competitive process because they provide rivals greater opportunity to compete for promotion on the merits and preserve G and rivals' incentives to innovate and compete.

G's OEM and carrier remedies enable partners to mix and match across/within devices, bar exclusivity, prohibit conditional licensing, and eliminate an "all or nothing" approach to promoting G search across access points. 

On cross, DOJ pointed to Murphy's testimony during the liability- he testified that partners would still pick G as the default absent exclusivity, which would mean having the same outcome/status quo.

In her rebuttal report, DOJ's expert, Dr. Chipty wrote: "Plaintiffs' proposals may go too far."

Murphy: I'd remove the 'may' and say they do go too far.

Consumer Welfare Appears in US v Google Search Case

Hello from #USvGoogle, the remedies trial in the DOJ's search case against Google kicks off today.

I'll be in court every day, sharing key moments and observations, so stay tuned for my daily updates!

Quick recap:

DOJ sued Google in 2020, claiming it illegally maintained monopolies in:

• General search services
• General search text ads
• Search advertising

Last fall, the court ruled partially in DOJ’s favor:

 ✅ Found Google monopolized general search and search text ads
 ❌ Dismissed the search advertising claim

Because the case bifurcated, we're now in the remedies phase—where the DOJ has proposed a sweeping set of structural and behavioral remedies.

I created a remedy tracker that summarizes what the DOJ proposed and will need to convince the court of.

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1KywBkMARxQXMJZiVofPYmZPyDqwRgMZ9_O2lCpfzlzE/edit?gid=0#gid=0

Since the ruling, DOJ has slightly softened some —like its initial bid to outright ban Google’s AI investments.

But its latest proposal still includes:

 • Divestiture of Chrome
 • Conditional divestiture of Android
 • Prior notice + gov't review of AI deals
 • Sale of data/search signals to rivals
 • Ban on rev-share deals
 • A new technical compliance committee

A point of contention is whether or not the DOJ has gone way beyond bounds in demanding structural and behavioral remedies outside of what the court found to be violating conduct—default and exclusionary deals. 

It is a bedrock antitrust principle that remedies must be proportionate to the violation found by the court, not broader. Courts avoid overreaching remedies that go beyond the competitive harm proven.

Some argue courts have broad discretion to restore competition. But others warn this is a remedy wishlist far beyond the bounds of the case tried.

To put things in perspective, the liability phase lasted 10+ wks, with the vast majority of time spent on defaults. AI was not part of the case, and Chrome/Android were barely mentioned. Yet now the DOJ is pursuing an expansive remedies package on un-litigated territory in 3 wks.

The DOJ itself has acknowledged that winning the liability phase but fumbling on remedies is like winning a battle, but losing the war.

They may have won the battle—but by overreaching on remedies with limited time and limited evidentiary grounding, they risk losing the war.

DOJ vs. Google Remedy Trial Preview

Anthropic stands firm, declaring that the DOJ's proposed remedies spell trouble for the company.

https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.223205/gov.uscourts.dcd.223205.1188.0.pdf

Despite the DOJ walking back its former proposal of forcing G to divest from Anthropic, it still imposes numerous restrictions on any transactions involving AI such as giving the DOJ advance notice, turning over sensitive strategic plans, and allowing the DOJ to delay the trans.

Such complications negatively affect Anthropic, as the uncertainty and delays created by the remedies might deter G's investment and hinders Anthropic's ability to negotiate with other investors.

Anthropic also asserts that the remedies adversely affect competition in AI markets, ironically harming smaller participants to the benefit of larger self-funded players.

Anthropic wants to step in to set the record straight.

There was no evidence introduced during the liability phase about AI, in part because of how rapid the space is moving. Now the remedies stand to handicap burgeoning companies like Anthropic, and they want to be heard.

Anthropic Doubles Down Against DOJ Remedies

📅 Scheduling update on the *other* FTC v. Amazon case, dealing w/ "dark patterns."

The case exploring a novel application of the ROSCA Act, is scheduled for a 2 wk trial in September. 

But the FTC, seeking a continuance, painted a very grim picture of their state of affairs. 

FTC: the proposed 2 week trial is far too short and we recognize appropriate length would pose scheduling issues. The agency is facing extreme resource shortfall in terms of money and personnel

FTC: the current April discovery cut-off hard is to meet, we don’t want to cut corners and waste resources on a deadline that could change. We have 8-10 fact witnesses and 3 experts and  think 3 weeks is reasonable and necessary for our case

FTC: it makes no sense given “dire resource constraints” to race to meet April 2025 cut off. Our situation is "severe and really unique”, we have lost employees on case team and across division

Judge Chun: I haven’t seen anything about DOGE and the FTC, is that what you’re referencing?

FTC: Yes, we have resignations bc of Fork in the Road email and for other reasons and due to lease reasons we are being required to vacate offices.

FTC: we are moving into an abandoned USAID office in April, “apparently” but that could change.  We need time to pack the office, we can’t purchase transcripts except on the slowest possible turnaround.

FTC: our travel cards have had limits reduced to $1 each, so we have to change on case by case which is slow and tedious

The FTC asked the court to reset trial for a later date in the fall and asked for relief from April deadline, calling the situation “sui generis” (latin for "of its own kind)

Judge Chun: I've never encountered situation like this. Any case law to support that this is for good cause?

FTC: Yes and no. We have been extremely diligent given the situation and bringing to court’s attention in a timely manner.

CT: are you making an oral motion for a trial continuance?

FTC: Yes w/caveat. If some way for 6 wk trial to commence on Sept 22, which understands isn't likely. Need 3 wks to present case. Continue trial to small degree to have 6 wk trial & relax current deadlines by several wks

AMZ: The notice for today was merely about length of trial, a motion to move the trial entirely is new to us. A 6 wk trial estimate for 8-10 witnesses & 3 experts is unheard of. 3 weeks is more than enough for both, the scope of issues is narrow

Judge Chun: I'm gonna short circuit this part, even assuming some FTC witnesses are so key that they need to testify at length, I’m in general agreement. This seems like a big overestimation. The bigger concern is FTC resources, what's your response?

AMZ: most counsel of record is the same. We see  no evidence of resource constraints, changes to trial team happen but none happened here.

"DOGE or no DOGE is not a basis for seeking a continuance."

AMZ: that was a lot of speculation about what "might happen", but we also did not see or hear anything about DOGE cuts to the FTC. Important to consider 3 individual defendants who had over 2+ years of case hanging over them

AMZ: we're well towards completion of discovery even after a previous 7 month extension of original timeline. We want to keep the date b/c the reality is it will get kicked along much further than couple months. Everyone (execs, attys, experts) cleared schedules for a Sept date

Judge Chun to FTC: you wanted something like a 2 month continuance, what is gonna change in those 2 months? If you’re in crisis now, whats gonna change in 2 months?

FTC: I can't guarantee that things wont even worse and we’ll have to deal with that. But we believe that we've been through the brunt of it for a while. If we need to move offices in April, that will be settled,  which is a big level of disruption. 

FTC: It will be easier for us to travel bc of going through new beaurocratic processes. It will be easier on attys if depositions are more spread out and we can see transcripts 

AMZ: there is still no showing that FTC doesn’t have resources. We need to see a demonstration, not oral argument with speculation. We need something in writing so we can respond on the diligence point

Judge Chun: that’s where I was going to go, I'm going to need a written motion

FTC: yes we can do that, preferably on an expedited schedule

Judge Chun: fine, that doesn’t sound like rocket science. What do you propose?

The FTC will file by Friday. AMZ's reply will be due next week and the FTC's reply several days later.

Judge Chun: if i decide trial is continued, I want both sides to tell me their available dates from the current trial range to mid 2026


Scheduling Update on the FTC v. Amazon Dark Patterns Case Goes Awry

A standout moment during Friday's Economics Day in the FTC v. Amazon "online superstore" case was when Judge Chun advised the FTC to "keep an eye on" a similar consumer case he is also overseeing that has been repeatedly dismissed.

Just the day prior, a panel of judges took another look at the consumer case (Hogan v. Amazon), slamming it again for being "extraordinarily light on any actual evidence" with arguments that are "muddled."

More details: https://www.law360.com/articles/2307117/9th-circ-shreds-muddled-argument-in-amazon-antitrust-case

The consumer case and the FTC's share fundamental claims. Both challenge AMZ's "buy box" feature, arguing it harms consumers & compels sellers to use AMZ's fulfillment service.

However. despite launching its investigation into AMZ years ago, evidence of that is still lacking.

On the panel, Judge Donato commented "I don't see anything in the second amended complaint that's anything other than conclusory statements about foreclosure with some actual evidence that cuts against you."

i.e. AMZ allows shoppers to choose different vendors & shipping methods

"This is the antithesis of foreclosing competition and excluding rivals. AMZ is actually featuring the rivals on its own page," 

"You have to cross the line of plausibility before you get to all this fancy econometrics and discovery and everything else that antitrust cases do."

Judge Chun's warning to the FTC to monitor this case closely, along with his question about whether their argument relies on a "boiling frog" allegory (suggesting shoppers appear content but are actually unaware of the danger), doesn’t send the best signal.

Boiled frog antitrust aside, this consumer case isn't the only case to undermine the FTC's case. 

I go into detail in my latest blog: https://medium.com/chamber-of-progress/legal-holes-have-opened-up-in-the-ftcs-antitrust-case-against-amazon-f25aecef7e67

Other private consumer suits have also poked holes in the FTC's case revealing inconsistent market definitions, conflicting narratives about Amazon’s pricing power, and dismissed Buy Box claims.

FTC v. Amazon Economics Day Highlights Failed Copycat Case

🏛️ Happening now: Status conference in DOJ v. Google remedies proceedings.

First topic of discussion: Anthropic's motion to participate as amicus curiae

Judge Mehta: in light of changed in remedies, is this motion still something Anthropic pressing with?

https://x.com/vidushi_law/status/1890549657287209204

Anthropic: we disagree with gov't position that motion is moot. Remedies still pose impact by imposing significant delays on investment into Anthropic. We will provide update by end of week after fully reviewing updated proposal.

DOJ v. Google: Status Conference Update

AMZ opened their presentation by rebutting the FTC taking a holistic approach in combining various forms of conduct. AMZ argued that economists will need to look at conduct separately.

https://x.com/vidushi_law/status/1897719259956232556

Case law: There can be no synergistic result from a number of acts,  none of which show causal antitrust injury

Case law: Courts disaggregate the exclusionary conduct into component parts before applying the relevant law

AMZ: 0+0+0=1, doesn't work. The FTC can't go back and revise the math to make it make sense.

On the AMZ store, relevant concepts economists will consider include: maximizing consumer welfare, product innovation, a free-rider problem, and AMZ's standards for seller conduct

Economists evaluate consumer welfare by looking at price, quality, convenience, available selection, overall output

Judge Chun: can you illustrate that in this case?

AMZ: lots of issues in this case relate to standards, almost like store policies that AMZ has for 3P sellers

Judge Chun, nodding to the Neo-Brandeisians: I have an understanding of the Chicago School focus on harms to consumer and pricing. Do tensions in academia permeate this case?

AMZ: No. Case law is consistent that consumer welfare is the “North star”. Competitive process that promotes competition on merits will translate to benefits to consumers. 

On the free rider problem it seeks to combat with policies regulating sellers, AMZ noted that some sellers may free ride by setting higher prices, price gouging, misleading marketing, overpromising delivery, and creating false reviews.

All of this could harm AMZ's reputation. 

But the FTC challenges AMZ for not featuring offers if the item is priced higher elsewhere. AMZ's rationale is this maintains their brand by ensuring customers find the best deals on their site.

AMZ is not saying to seller that they are barred from AMZ, just that their offer is not eligible to be featured seller. 

The goal is not to tell sellers what to do off of AMZ, but that they need to lower their price in order to be eligible as a featured offer.

On first party price matching, AMZ seeks to offer competitive prices for customers when AMZ is operating as a first-party retailer. Unilateral pricing is lawful, even by a monopolist

Cts are not in the biz to prevent lowering prices, minus evidence of predatory pricing tactics.

Judge Chun: on relevant markets, the FTC talks about first and last stop on shopping trip, who else seeks to do that?

AMZ: you need real life data to suggest that a substantial # of consumers only go to AMZ when they have a grocery list and that AMZ is the only place they go. 

AMZ: Is the typical person who comes on AMZ just buying 1-2 products or a much larger cluster of products?

If you see a lot of 1-2 product purchases, economists will tell you that competition for those products must include a lot of other retailers 

Judge Chun: what about repeat customers who turn to AMZ for various needs and occasions?

AMZ: then AMZ has successfully won their trust, but it doesn’t tell you that AMZ has raised prices or lowered quality. AMZ can’t price discriminate against loyal customers or generate diff prices for diff customers

Judge Chun: so smart shopper benefits from other options?

AMZ: yes

The FTC skirted this in their presentation but according to the complaint, their market includes AMZ, eNay, Target and Walmart (online only)

It excludes Target and Walmart (brick and mortar), Best Buy, Home Depot, Costco, Sephora, Wayfair, Chewy, Macys,  Kolhs, Walgreens etc.

Judge Chun: what is the % of AMZ marketshare in terms of being an online product seller?

AMZ: don’t know, if you look at all online sellers and not just FTC competitors...

...But if just Walmart physical stores are added to equation, AMZ's market share would be nowhere near threshold for monopoly power.

If you include all online retailers, same applies.

Economists are expected to provide data to support this.

AMZ argued there are a lack of significant barriers to entry. In recent years:

Established retailers launched seller marketplaces- Target, Kohl's, Walmart, Nordstrom, Macy's

New methods emerged for brands to reach consumers- Shopify, Tiktok shop, Google shopping, Facebook marketplace

Established retailers have pivoted to omni-channel: Home Depot, Walmart, Sephora, Kroger. Nordstrom, BestBuy 

On supra competitive seller fees, economists will look at the all-in cost of doing biz with each retail channel, varying fee structures among retailers in the properly defined market, the extent to which retailers provide diff services, and the extent to which AMZ services are superior

On AMZ standards, economists will consider if the standards allow AMZ to ensure competitive prices and high quality shopping experience, have they resulted in higher prices, reduced output or lower quality, do competitors employ similar standards, if there is econ evidence to indicate a causal connection with the alleged effects, and what would change in market if AMZ did not have these standards

After about 3.5 hours of presentations (from lawyers mind you!), Judge Chun  thanked both sides and requested proposals on when the next Economics Day should occur, this time with actual economists!

FTC v. Amazon Economics Day- Amazon's Presentation

The FTC was up first but before they began their presentation, Judge Chun pointed out the last sentence in AMZ’s brief. 

Judge Chun: I underscore "to the detriment of consumers." What harm to consumers is the FTC seeking to prove? Lower quality, higher prices?

https://x.com/vidushi_law/status/1897719259956232556

FTC: we are challenging the course of conduct prohibiting rivals from competing, which indirectly raises pricers for sellers and shoppers

Judge Chun: aren’t you going to hypothesize what would happen absent the conduct you’re challenging, and whether rivals would have gotten scale?

FTC: we posit that price and selection were impacted. But we can't quantify what would have occurred or create a but-for world that would have developed. 

Judge Chun: who are AMZ’s competition in online superstore mkt?

FTC: there can be smaller markets, we have "few cuts" of markets under consideration. But don't have definitive answer” on who is in mkt

Judge Chun: is there case law that recognizes your proposed mkts?

FTC: can’t think of any, but market analysts report market shares in this industry

Judge Chun: is the term “online superstore” and your other market 
generated by the FTC or is it found in economic literature?

FTC: not certain, we didn’t cite to any documents where that term was drawn from

On market definition, the FTC distinguished between defining competition and recognizing competition.

Defining comp is the process in which firms: try to win biz from other firms, drive firms to lower price and increase quality, and otherwise offer a better deal to customers to win biz

Recognizing comp looks at the degree of comp driven by availability of substitutes and how close those substitutes are. If there are lots of good alternatives, sign of strong competition. If few/no good alternatives, a sign of weak competition.

Law on mkt def says products can compete in multiple valid markets, there is no specific methodology required, and no precise bounds/metes.

Economic principles look at reasonable substitutes, demand substitutes, assess whether comp within candidate market matters to market outcomes and barriers to entry

On monopoly power, Judge Chun asked how many 3P sellers are in anti-discounting agreements with AMZ

FTC: until 2019, all sellers were in price parity agreements with AMZ. But after 2019, AMZ applies algorithm to filter out sellers from the buy box 

Judge Chun: how do you define reasonable substitutes for AMZ?  Do you look at general shoppers or someone who is looking for a pair of shoes?

FTC: relevant analogy is one-stop shop, we are looking at competition to be the go-to store for shoppers

One big yikes moment for the FTC: Judge Chen asked if the harmed “consumer” is actually the seller, as opposed to the shopper.

The FTC replied yes. Judge Chun then called out a consumer case (Hogan v. Amazon), that he also oversees and where arguments took place yesterday. 

“Keep an eye on that.”

Why? Well that case mirrors some of the FTC’s case and is going pretty poorly. 

How poorly? Well here’s an idea:

This is good chance to plug my Medium article on how these consumer copy-cat case, including the one Judge Chun called out, may actually turn out to be nails in the coffin for the FTC’s case (though I use a stinky cheese analogy ;)).
https://medium.com/chamber-of-progress/legal-holes-have-opened-up-in-the-ftcs-antitrust-case-against-amazon-f25aecef7e67

Judge Chun also referred to the Hovenkamp quote in AMZ’s brief that customer shopping habits don’t limit them to one retailer or even type of retailer- you can buy kitchen appliances at AMZ, Target.com, a brick and mortar store. 

FTC replied that there is a distinction between store level and product-by-product competition. 

On anti-discounting tactics, the FTC stated that AMZ trains other retailers to not discount, creating price mirroring. They also alleged that AMZ uses game theory which could be shown by economic analysis of strategic interactions.

On fulfillment coercion, AMZ reduces other stores’ access to sellers due to increased multi-homing cuts and a reduced store neutral ecosystem. Judge Chun asked if the FTC could point to a good analogy in other cases.

The FTC cited restricting access as relevant, saying, "Cutting off access or weakening supply…that’s what I think was happening here.” 

Pan over to AMZ's attorneys looked baffled, as AMZ neither stops sellers from selling elsewhere nor requires exclusivity.

Judge Chun: Big picture, millions of shoppers are happy with AMZ. They like the convenient service & they’re happy with prices. Are you saying they are the proverbial frogs in water that is getting warmer but they can’t tell?

FTC: Yes, b/c they don’t know what they’re missing.

FTC v. Amazon Economics Hearing- The FTC's Presentation

🏛Expect a big update today in DOJ v. Google search remedies: Parties will be filing their final remedy proposals & final witness lists leading up to a ~3 week remedy trial in late April.

The DOJ's current proposal is an everything but the kitchen sink approach (heck maybe the sink too): banning defaults deals, breaking off Chrome, breaking off Android, banning G's AI investments, prohibiting Google/Apple partnerships, giving away G's search data etc. 

Re-upping my remedy tracker that goes into detail on all of the DOJ's proposed remedies and the concerns they raise ⬇️ :

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1vxCspC-MVZudMxYRbk2zwd22XckCQDiM5xjF_LJDKY0/edit?usp=sharing

But that framework was filed in November and the DOJ is under new leadership. Most of the DOJ lawyers who brought and fought the liability phase are long gone. But does this mean the new DOJ is going to walk back its laundry list of remedies? 

Here's what makes me skeptical of seeing any major changes:

1️⃣ This case was brought under the first Trump administration, as a phishing expedition to appease Trump's ire at "big tech censorship". 

Enter a neo-Brandesian DOJ who shaped the case to actually be about antitrust, not censorship. Well we're back to a Trump admin who is still gung-ho about going after big tech censorship. 

While both are eager to challenge big tech companies... the rest is unclear.

But hey, it's a "Trump welfare" world and we're just living in it 🍿

2️⃣ Trump DOJ appointees made it clear that big tech cases will proceed and they will continue to scrutinize tech.

This case is the furthest along. Judge Mehta signaled that a change in leadership could mean changes in the DOJ's approach, so he'd rather know now than later.

But there is some reason to think that the final remedies will take a less aggressive stance and that some proposals may be dialed back. 

1️⃣ Trump declined to comment on breaking up Google

Despite his feelings towards G, Trump explicitly stopped short of endorsing a break up. Putting his personal feelings aside, Trump ack'd the critical role G plays in American competition against China. 

2️⃣  The new admin is vocal and critical of the harsh treatment from the EU of US tech giants

The White House released a memo last month called "Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties"

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/defending-american-companies-and-innovators-from-overseas-extortion-and-unfair-fines-and-penalties/

Lambasting the EU and other foreign countries for penalizing innovative US tech companies that have contributed to the growth of the American economy and then turning around to follow suit would be an interesting, and not at all contradictory, choice. But hey. 

3️⃣ Comments from Melissa Holyoak on remedies

This one came as a surprise but just two weeks ago, she said that causal connection is KEY in crafting remedies and to avoid a MSFT repeat, Judge Mehta needs to view each violating act individually when considering remedies.

https://x.com/vidushi_law/status/1893061658982932484

3️⃣ Sheer scope v. Time

The liability trial lasted 2+ months and focused on default deals. The remedy trial is intended to last 14 days and the DOJ's proposed remedies cover default deals, breaking up Google, investments into AI, sharing search data, syndication etc.

Convincing the court of the applicability of all their proposed remedies in these areas seems like an unreasonably tall order.

Sooooo... are substantive changes likely?