Someone really has to throw that brick.
So I'll volunteer, with this short thread on Gryphon Scientific role in a few important key biosafety assessment reports.
@alisonannyoung @RandPaul @SenJoniErnst @JamieMetzl @R_H_Ebright
x.com/murraygilman/status/1805412002333868507
A first major product of Gryphon Scientific was its work on the NBAF facility in Kansas.
The first report (2010) showed an inacceptable 70% risk of escape over 50 years.
It was followed by a revised report in 2012, to which Gryphon also took part.
x.com/gdemaneuf/status/1533002771817201664
In that second report, the risk was suddenly found to be around 0.1% over 50-years.
A 1/630 risk reduction!
x.com/gdemaneuf/status/1534132535730802689
I wrote extensively about it.
It was a beautiful sleight of hand, which did not impress the National Research Council.
x.com/gdemaneuf/status/1533002783338938369
But, right, it's all about fighting terrorists and some usual pork-barrel politics, so we shall look somewhere else.
x.com/gdemaneuf/status/1534135452315566081
The second major product of Gryphon Scientific was the 2016 report they did for the review of the GoF policies.
That report was instrumental in the lifting of the GOF moratorium in 2017.
x.com/gdemaneuf/status/1533600329115508736
The one problem with that report was the fairly low baseline pathogen risk they were asked to consider.
Not their choice, ok..
But for sure, using their report based on that baseline, as a basis for restarting GoF with much more risky pathogens was a sleight of hand.
Also, I have issues with their (non) modelling of human factors, especially when applied to weak institutional context like China.
If you are going to use their report to allow offloading GoF to China, you need the right baselines.
x.com/gdemaneuf/status/1383353079500742657
OK. So what is this all about?
Gryphon Scientific has some great scientists.
But they are a commercial company and they can't poke the ribs of their customers too much.
Also, they don't set the baselines they are asked to consider.
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/nbaf_updated_ssra_volume_ii.pdf
Nor can they control the way their advice may be used to justify policies which are then applied to totally different contexts (institutional, cultural, pathogens, ..).
I am not sure that they would get a new contract if they stood up and said 'Oh wait.. You can't do that'
Gilles Demaneuf
@gdemaneuf
Pointy Head. Opinions, analyses and views expressed are purely mine and should not in any way be characterised as representing any institution or company.