1/24 π¨ New insights into #COVID19Origins! π In this thread, I reveal previously unreported key aspects:
1οΈβ£ Direct connections between the CIA and virologist Ralph Baric in U.S.-China virology cooperation and monitoring. π΅οΈββοΈπ¨π³ @SenRandPaul
2οΈβ£ The complete ODNI BSEG composition as of Sep 2020βnever published before.
2/24 Context:
The BSEG, est. 2006, is an advisory panel designed to assist U.S. intelligence on biological threats, incl. viruses and biosafety. π¦
π Meetings are classified and managed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. @thackerpd
4/24 I was the first to highlight Baric's late Jan 2020 BSEG briefing, where he discussed possible non-natural origins like accidental release or engineering. π¬
Noted in my Jan 2025 Proximal Origin update.
(See my X post: x.com/gdemaneuf/status/1883465391156109423) π @DrJBhattacharya
5/24 Exclusive:
My finding of the full BSEG membership list from Sep 2020 π―
27 experts, Baric and 26 other members such as Relman, Inglesby, Brent and Franz. π
The membership list was never disclosed until now.
@USRightToKnow@FreeBeacon@RecomendsFaults
6/24 Found it by proving that BSEG = B Group, then searching for 'B Group' in FOIs.
Key email emerged! π
7/24 Think about it: π€
I found out about the BSEG meeting of end January 2020 because of a likely transcript error that meant it escaped being redacted out (BSEC for BSEG).
Then I found the membership list because of an unexpected alias ('B Group') that also escaped...
8/24 Also important:
I document the CIA's outreach to Baric, shortly after a 2015 BSEG meeting and just prior to his Track-II workshop in Beijing.
This highlights interplay between collaboration and oversight in U.S.-China virology. π€π @joshrogin@KatherineEban
9/24 In doc published Oct 30, 2025, by Sen. Rand Paul's in his request to DNI Tulsi Gabbard, we find this email;
CIA: "The topic concerns Coronavirus evolution..." π
Raises questions on balance between scientific collaboration, true risk reduction and pure intelligence work. π€π‘οΈ
@JustinRGoodman
10/24 Said otherwise;
Following a 2015 BSEG meeting, the CIA contacted Baric to work on a 'coronavirus project'. π΅οΈββοΈ
.. Rght before Baric flew to Beijing to discuss synthetic biology and GoF risks, as part of the US-designed cooperation/surveillance game (Track II).
@JamieMetzl
11/24 In same docs, we get confirmation of my educated guess that spurred Sen. Rand Paul:
On Jan 29, 2020, Baric presented slides outlining three potential origins:
natural evolution, accidental lab release, and genetic engineering. π
Slide 22 addressed WIV's role in a possible accidental scenario. π¦ @francoisballoux
12/24 As per BSEG slide from Baric:
WIV sequenced thousands of SARS-like bat coronaviruses and cultured under BSL-2, despite hACE2 receptor use and human cell growth. π¬
"Do this work under BSL2 conditions; despite virus use of hACE2..." @deborahblum
13/24 This raises huge concerns, as BSL-2 totally inadequate protection for such pathogens
β οΈ BSEG Briefing shows early U.S. intel being told of real possibility of lab accident.
My educated guess: this links to MI5 and the Farrar-Fauci call on 1 Feb 2020.
@SenTomCotton@mgordonws
14/24 More Context:
Four main U.S.-China workshops on emerging infections and gain-of-function research in for 2015-2019, organized by CISAC.
These events were meant to build 'informal' non-gov ties amid dual-use concerns. π€π‘οΈ
@SenJoniErnst@TheHonestBroker
15/24 The Beijing 2015 event officially addressed synthetic biology, GoF risks, transparency, regulation, etc.
16/24 Baric, Franz and Shi presented,π€
David Franz deplored U.S. gain-of-function moratorium and more generally the regulation efforts! He preferred to leave it to lab heads.
Looks like the Chinese side listened carefully.
@RepBradWenstrup
17/24 But don't forget:
The Baric example shows how US intel can also piggyback on the US-China 'Scientific' cooperation process.
The 'unofficial' Track-II channels are not exactly that neutral.
Fair game IMHO. βοΈ
18/24 Side-note:
CISAC (BSEG Franz key player) used access to top scientists (such as BSEG Baric) to overcome its limited capabilities and budget.
It was competing with bigger Arlington-based CRDF (Civilian Research and Development Foundation) and Inglesby (BSEG member too).
19/24 'Competing' is the word, and in this case it had stupid consequences: hawking US science for a seat around a table.
20/24 Bonus:
I also identified some July-Aug 2020 emails between BSEG members.
There, BSEG Roger Brent calls the natural origin consensus a "myth". π₯
He also highlighted the Mojiang mine infections (linked to WIV via Li Xu's thesis).
21/24 Shifting focus:
Kavita Berger, BSEG member who unwittingly disclosed the BSEG members list, worked at Gryphon Scientific.
She led controversial 2015-2016 NIH-commissioned Risk and Benefit Analysis (RBA) of gain-of-function research, influencing NSABB policy. π
22/24 That GoF RBA was controversial for its assumptions, approach, and rather limiting Terms of Reference.β οΈ
Anyway, it ended up being used to justify the end of the GoF moratorium in 2017.
23/24 If that looks bad, check Gryphon Scientific's previous risk evaluation for the NBAF (a controversial animal P4 in Kansas).:
x.com/gdemaneuf/status/1533002783338938369