We ask what factors are associated with adopting five workers' rights preemptions from 1993 to 2018 by testing five hypotheses for preemption. Consistently, we find more ideologically conservative legislatures preempt more often.
We argue ideology is far more precise than party at the subnational level and allows us to explain why some Republican dominated legislatures preempt often and others do not. Less conservative Republican legislatures do not preempt at the same rate as more conservative ones.
Additionally, more politically unified state governments (regardless of party) also preempt more often, providing evidence to the thought that trifectas are important for preemption activity.
No other factors are important. Importantly, legislative professionalism is not important, defying some prior literature (including our own work).
We argue that a generalized model of preemption may not be possible, at least not on the front end. There are too many policy-area-specific factors to account for in the specifications. We suggest going policy-area by policy-area and triangulating after the fact.
There's a bit more, but I'll leave that to when the paper officially comes out. Enjoy!
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