🧵A Thread on @stacksfi_xyz, an emerging revenue sharing project launching on Ethereum

1/n
Stacks is an investment community and DAO that owns a treasury funded by the sale of Stacks NFTs: a limited collection of 4000 unique NFTs that basically represent shares of the treasury (finally a true use case besides pfp)

2/n
Every month NFT holders will receive their share of the profits from the invested Treasury (in the form of $USDC)

50% of the treasury profits is reinvested
50% is ditributed to holders

3/n
additionally holders have access to some perks such as:
-voting rights
-access to research and alpha
-access to private channels

4/n
Why would you want to let other people invest your money?

a big enough treasury will be able to invest in early stage projects and partecipate in exclusive presales

5/n
@stacksfi_xyz basically aims to become a decentralized and community driven VC.

who manages this treasury?

6/n
having NFT holders directly choose the projects to invest in through governance would be controversial and time consuming

7/n
The idea is that investors in @stacksfi_xyz won't have to worry about any of this stuff and earn rewards passively.

So there are 3 main levels of authority: Team, Counsel and Stackers

8/n
TEAM: has the final say on the investments, manages multisig

COUNSEL: active investors that research new opportunities, voted by the DAO

STACKERS(NFT holders): members of the DAO, they vote on any issue put up by the team.

9/n
How can I trust the treasury managers?
to avoid any issues related to the identity of the treasury managers (what happened with sifu)

-every team member will be KYCd with @CertiK
-2 community members will be part of the multisig wallet (multiple people needed to sign a tx)

10/n
On top of this Treasury Managers aren't paid a salary and they only make profit from their own NFTs, so it's in their best intrest  to make the treasury grow

Every investment and balance sheet will be transparent thanks to the blockhain to prevent what happened with Alameda

11/n
As the treasury grows, the underlying share of Stacks NFTs grows in value. This combined with increasing demand and popularity of the project will result in the price of the NFT itself increase

12/n
NFTs distribution:

- 2 NFTs/day for 50 days
- 1 NFT/day until 2033

This makes the collection supply limited (like bitcoins) and at some point the only way for new investors to partecipate will be to buy the NFTs directly from holders

13/n
Where does the treasury invest?

in solid and well researched projects as well as keeping a high % into $ETH (in staking), stables (farming), LPs and delta neutral strategies

*NO DEGEN PLAYS*

14/n
What if they go wrong?

it will only result in a cut of the overall treasury balance and the assets tied to your NFT but you won't incur into a direct monthly loss. In other words your passive income rewards can't go negative

15/n

Finally, for more information check out the
-official website: https://stacksfi.xyz/
-Docs: https://docs.stacksfi.xyz/project/
-Twitter: @stacksfi_xyz
-discord group: https://discord.com/invite/zpmUK2e4ST

Stacks, revenue sharing NFTs

🧵 A step-by-step tutorial thread on $DSM staking

#Desmos @DesmosNetwork

In order to stake $DSM and start earning rewards you'll first need to have a  @ForboleX wallet

Download the official chrome extension here: https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/forbole-x/fmblappgoiilbgafhjklehhfifbdocee/

Then log into the @ForboleX web app at https://x.forbole.com/ and click on "Get Started".

After choosing the password needed to unlock the wallet, click on "create wallet" or "import wallet" to connect your @Ledger device

To start staking click on "Staking" on the left menu (https://x.forbole.com/staking)

now you'll see the full list of 124 network validators that you can delegate your precious $DSM to

Choose wisely as your delegated $DSM and rewards will depend on their behaviour

Here are some tips to help you picking the right validators:

- Stake with validators that have good reputation in the cosmos
- Check the validator stats (uptime, self-delegation, etc.)
- Diversify your stake among multiple validators
- Don't stake with 0% fees validators

Finally click on "delegate" next to the validator of your choice, input the amount of coins to delegate and continue

if you wish to delegate to multiple validators just click on "add validator" and select the % amount

Always make sure to keep some $DSM for the transaction fees (you'll need some to claim rewards too)

if you ever run out of gas you can use the @Stakely_io faucet  https://stakely.io/en/faucet/desmos-dsm

This will prompt the @ForboleX extension window where you can review the transaction.

click on "confirm" to submit the transaction on-chain and officially start earning 20% APR

To view and manage your delegations head over to the "wallets" page (https://x.forbole.com/wallets)

you can now perform 3 actions by clicking on "manage":

- withdraw rewards
- redelegate to another validator instantly
- undelegate your $DSM (you'll have to wait 14 days)

Bonus feature: thanks to @StakeEco it's possible to automatically compound rewards on a daily basis using their tool at: https://restake.app/desmos

You can read the unrolled version of this thread here: https://typefully.com/Raimo_0/rGcPVsl

$DSM Staking

Solution to the latest @SCRT_Agency contest
👇

https://twitter.com/SCRT_Agency/status/1565729263009120256

This time the agent gave us no clue at all, not even his (supposedly) private wallet address to begin with.

First thing that crossed my mind was that the agent must've used the @Stakely_io faucet as otherwise, without an address to analyze, it would've been impossible to spot 


The way this faucet works is that in order to use it you must post a tweet from a twitter account you own to "verify" your identity and prove you're a human.


Unlike a mixer however the faucet doesn't wait any time between the publication of the tweet and the funding $SCRT tx, so it's relatively easy to find the address by knowing the respective twitter username and viceversa...

It's possible because of the publicness of the faucet itself, the faucet only has 1 address per coin from which it receives donations and sends $SCRT to the various addresses

In fact the faucet's $SCRT address can be found directly on the main page.

We can confirm it's this one by checking the bahaviour on-chain using mintscan.io

Now what's left to do is find the twitter account from which Agent0000 made the tweet.

Every faucet tweet has the same format with the hashtags #Stakely and $SCRT 👇

What I did next was just using the Twitter search bar (with "#Stakely $SCRT" as input, order by date of publication, and just scroll down until I saw a familiar username

Now I know that the Secret Agency (ppl who organized this contest) requested some funds from the faucet on the 27th of Aug at exactly 6:54 AM

https://twitter.com/SCRT_Agency/status/1563389531289571328

a bit suspicious right?

At this point what's left to do is check the on-chain history of txs coming from the Stakely.io address and find a tx that occured at that time

For this it's better to use secretnodes.com instead of mintscan as it shows you the full date format instead of "1h ago"

I found the tx pretty easily as the faucet isn't used that much:
https://secretnodes.com/secret/transactions/7BC5902621AEA29C86853129C675D5C713F754D73F045820A3D346813293067E

The receiving wallet is: secret1l4rne3mm5v3hvzdkfjyydklcnyjx365vc6w4r3 

which could very well be the one we're looking for as it only performed 6 total txs and holds 50 unstaked $SCRT (that usually is the price for these challenges)


What did Agent0000 do wrong? well he should've used a brand new twitter account registered with a fake mail, fake number etc. (better to do everything with a good VPN)

you're maybe wondering what the #privacy option on Stakely.io is for then.

what it does is it just hides your username from the list on their website

Solution to the Secret Agent000 contest

Solution to the latest @SCRT_Agency contest IMO (NOT OFFICIAL SOLUTION)
👇

https://twitter.com/SCRT_Agency/status/1563166441628569602

by looking at the history of "secret16qzjwhy0x86r6zau7jy4543y9ckraxzgwk8t9w" we can see he made 8 txs interacting with some Secret Tokens (sSCRT, ALTER)

Let's analyze them closely 1 by 1

1st tx: 4CCA42AB80A729F86296E529295999AEF752B8F2701CEB3EDD3F3AAF049E9DCF

we can see that the Agent interacted with the sSCRT contract, and by looking at the fees spent (0.005 SCRT) we can assume it's a standard send tx with avg fees (I simulated in Keplr)

Fees play a very important role in this contest, as they give information on what action was performed within a specific contract, and leak the initial amount of native $SCRT that Agent000  had in his wallet (will get to that later)

2nd tx:4822ABA552D30FDB1304AE82353AEF9C5659D4DCD7EDFD9012080E9EC16DFE83

again, the Agent interacted with sSCRT contract and we can be sure that this isn't a wrapping tx by looking at the "sent_funds" parameter in the metadata

This time however the agent paid an insane amount of fees by (I assume) manually increasing GAS amount

I think this was done on purpose by the creator of the contest to distract/make everything right (you'll understand later)

3rd tx: 1756E36013A39A5D9EC3BAB529B2F9479623695ECE3152236227686A5359E9BC

this one is basically a copy-paste of the previous two:
it's a send tx of a Secret Token (this time $ALTER)

What do these 3 txs tell us about the connection with Agent000's other wallet?

first we must understand HOW he funded his wallet

There are many ways to privately seed a SCRT wallet (as listed on the article https://medium.com/@secretnetwork/private-secret-wallet-how-to-a842776c6531):

-Blackbox Cloak tool
-@stakely_io $SCRT faucet
-Secret Pizza on discord

We can safely exclude the last two options because in the history of the Agent's wallet there isn't a "receving" tx prior to any other.

so, he must have used Blackbox.cash's cloak tool

Which is definately a great tool, but not perfect:

By analyzing the anonymity set we can link the wrapping and receving txs.
The only information that’s not private is the contract interaction, the amount of SCRT received and the IP of the receiver.

to do this however we need the to know the exact amount of native $SCRT that the Agent received from BlackBox.

But for now we are only aware of the small amount that he used to pay for tx fees.

4th tx: 0EAB9BBB7A8AEB9B5E18D331C489161121A838C5C4C966744F8EB3A4978BBC9A

This tx looks like the others but if we look closely the "sent_funds" parameter is not empty and showing 1M uSCRT (or 1 $SCRT)

this means that the Agent wrapped exactly 1 $SCRT into 1 $sSCRT

also by looking at the GAS required we can assume that he used app.sienna.network/wrap instead of wrap.scrt.network

5th tx:
BF29689AC50390E303885AC69B4793C3071F5AB610A9A3261B9D9C762376C43B

We can immediately notice that this tx failed, and by analyzing the error msg (on Mintscan) we can see that the Agent was trying to wrap another 1 $SCRT into $sSCRT but he didn't have enough in the wallet

(It's not the opposite because we have seen before that he has at least 1 $sSCRT)

the error msg leaks the remaining amount of $SCRT in his wallet: 894200 uSCRT --> 0.8942 $SCRT

This info was the missing piece of the puzzle because now we can calculate the amount of $SCRT that the agent withdrew from BlackBox.

We can get that number by summing up:
the remaining amount(0.8942)+txs fees(0.005+0.084+0.005+ 0.0059+0.0059) + wrapped amount(1) = 2.0000 $SCRT

Now what's left to do is check in the history of the $sSCRT contract to see if there's any entity who wrapped exactly 3 $SCRT  (2 + 1 cloak fee).

There will likely be more entities, but only one of them is the wallet we are trying to find

To reduce the anonymity set we can search for txs that occured before the 21st of August at 04:54:37 UTC, which is when the Agent first used his $SCRT on the new "private" wallet

For this I'll use secretnodes.com as it lets you scroll back the blockchain history much faster by changing numbers in the url

Out of more than 150txs I only found 2 addresses that wrapped exactly 3 $SCRT:

secret13flhagcuyea76v2t3akm57n6p6kl654kmfhtxm
secret18z0af6chdrt0g3lsj7uc0mkwmslcf5g796tspu

The first one only has a record of 12 txs so It's more likely that they used it for this contest

The second one has a record of 1300+ txs so I speculate it's the personal wallet of one of the ppl making this contest that they used to distract / increase the anonymity set

Long story short, Agent000 should've waited longer between the wrapping and the claiming from cloak to further increase the anonimity set.

here's a list of pro tips when using Cloak:
- not wrap and send the same amount of tokens
- make multiple decoy transactions
- use a VPN


Solution to the Secret Agent000 contest IMO

🧵

Millions of DeFi traders on public blockchains have been secretly taken advantage of over the past few years in a process called Miner Extractable Value

In this thread I'll explain what MEV is, how it works and how #SecretNetwork got rid of this problem

$SCRT $BUTT 

👇

1/n

MEV is the term used for the (potential) profit that block producers (validators/miners who create new blocks) can make with specific behaviour

MEV is often considered into Good & Bad eventhough the result is profit for blockproducers over standard users

2/n

𝗕𝗮𝗱 𝗠𝗘𝗩, also(wrongly) dubbed frontrunning, consists in taking advantage of blockchain users by including, excluding or reordering txs inside a block and is performed by the block producers (both on PoW and PoS chains)

3/n

So what exactly are block producers taking advantage of?

Most of the MEV activity is related to AMM usage:
When you do a swap the price fluctuates and, in public blockchains, everyone can see it coming.

4/n

Ideally, benevolent validators would pick txs with higher fees first to take the bonus, and leave ones with lower fees waiting in the mempool.

Bad validators who take advantage of MEV sacrifice the fee bonus to put your tx on hold and profit from the movement

5/n

This is possible because block producers can chose the single txs to include in their block and in what order they should be performed

Therefore, once they see your swap waiting to be finalized, block prudcers can:

6/n

-calculate the price effect
-submit another tx (usually 2) to profit from the coming movement
-propose the next block including both txs in inverted order

As a result you will incur in unexpected slippage (your trade will be executed at a worse price)

7/n

Good MEV (aka 𝗮𝗿𝗯𝗶𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗴𝗲) is the process of favouring liquidation and arbitrage txs, even if they're submitted by the block producer. 

8/n

imo it can’t even be called MEV since:

- it happens after the block is final
- it doesn’t require for a txn reordering
- it’s needed to fill inefficiencies

9/n

Unlike arbitrage, bad MEV isn’t always 100% successful and its success rate depends on the time that the proposer has to:

- pick the txn from the mempool before others
- reorder txs before the block gets validated (~6 seconds on Secret)

10/n

Cross-chain MEV is a concern for the future of the #CosmosEcosystem because of the slow finality and publicness of the #IBC protocol.

11/n

Imagine how big the MEV problem will be on Crosschain-contracts based AMMs... This is why a crosschain DEX aggregator built on Secret would have a huge advantage.

12/n

𝗙𝗿𝗼𝗻𝘁 𝗥𝘂𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 is often used in combination with MEV and it consists in trading with inside information of another tx waiting to be validated in the mempool and preceding that with a faster one (higher GAS fee).

13/n

The difference between MEV and Frontrunning is the fact that MEV requires the block producer to reorder txs, while Frontrunning can be performed by anyone with access to a block explorer like @mintscanio (and a fast bot 🙃)

14/n

Anyway both are possible because of the public nature of blockchains, popular DEXs such as @osmosiszone are the targets and users are paying the price!

There are various complex solutions to them, but Secret Network definitely has the simplest and most effective:

15/n

Bad MEV and Frontrunning are impossible due to an encrypted mempool and blockchain state:

With the use of 𝐓𝐄𝐄𝐬 nobody (even validators) can see the content of blocks making it impossible to extract the necesarry information to frontrun txs.

cutt.ly/VZDCDe0

16/n

On Secret the new LP pool info is accessible as soon as the block is final so that everyone can take advantage of arbitrage opportunities at the same time 

17/n

The frontrunning problem also applies to CEXs and OrderBook based DEXs such as @DyDx, @InjectiveLabs, @SushiSwap, @CrescentHub, @TeamKujira.

Frtunately, once again, the modularity of the Secret Blockchain allows for DEXs to be built in it and avoid the problem.

18/n

This solution was adopted by ButtonSwap, @sienna_network, @secret_swap and ShadeSwap which use Secret Contracts and Secret Tokens to hide the txs metadata.

This protects user’s financial privacy and investments at the same time.

19/n

@Btn.group took it to the next level by building a private (front running and MEV resistant) OrderBook based DEX.

They made it so that, unlike traditional orderbooks, orders are only visible by the users placing them (or anybody that has the viewing key) 