Institute For The Study Of War - Russo Ukrainian War Update, November 24, 2023

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Replying to:

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian aviation industry is likely facing significant constraints due to international sanctions and demands from the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 23 that it obtained many documents from the Russian Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya) detailing widespread issues within the Russian aviation industry.[105] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728841409115922499?s=20

The GUR reported that the documents show that there were 185 civil aviation accidents and 150 cases of technical malfunctions in the first nine months of 2023.[106] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728841409115922499?s=20

The GUR reported that the Russian aviation industry is transferring large portions of aircraft maintenance assets to Iran, where repairs occur without certification, due to a lack of repair capacity and specialists in Russia.[107] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728841409115922499?s=20

Russian aviation enterprises are reportedly increasingly using existing planes for component for new production.[108] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728841409115922499?s=20

The Russian United Aircraft Corporation announced on November 22 that it transferred a new batch of Su-34 frontline bombers manufactured at the Novosibirsk Aviation Plant to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[109] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728841927548686488?s=20

Widespread constraints on the civil aviation industry are likely also impacting defense aviation enterprises in Russia, but Russian officials are likely prioritizing military aviation production over the maintenance and production of civil aircraft.

Russian courts have reportedly considered over 4,000 criminal cases against Russian personnel for the unauthorized abandonment of their units since the start of partial mobilization.

Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported on November 24 that Russian courts considered 4,121 criminal cases for the unauthorized abandonment of a military unit and ruled in 3,740 cases as of November 21.[110] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728843503994552349?s=20

Mediazona reported that Russian courts have delivered sentences to roughly 100 Russian personnel a week on average since June 2023.[111] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728843503994552349?s=20

Russian personnel from Russian federal subjects (regions) in Siberia and the Far East continue to represent a disproportionate number of Russian casualties in Ukraine.

The BBC reported on November 24 that confirmed Russian military deaths per 10,000 males aged 16 to 61 in federal subjects of Russia show that the highest proportions of death happen in Siberian and Far Eastern regions.[112] x.com/FAB87F/status/1728845194475298958?s=20

The five highest proportions of military deaths occurred in the Tuva Republic (48.6 deaths), Republic of Buryatia (36.7 deaths), Nenets Autonomous Okrug (30 deaths), Altai Republic (26.5 deaths), and Transbaikal Krai (26.2 deaths).[113] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728845194475298958?s=20

St. Petersburg and Moscow have the lowest proportion of confirmed deaths with 2.5 and 1 per 10,000, respectively.[114] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728845194475298958?s=20

Russian authorities continue to prevent the relatives of mobilized personnel from holding rallies calling for the demobilization of their relatives.

Russian independent investigative outlet Verstka reported on November 23 that Russian authorities denied five applications for rallies by relatives of mobilized personnel in Moscow, Chelyabinsk, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, and Krasnoyarsk.[115] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728846427067953464?s=20

Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported that Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin denied an appeal to his office’s decision to refuse permits for a rally in support of demobilization by citing COVID-19 public health restrictions.[116] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728846884742005115?s=20

Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported that officials in Novosibirsk Oblast accepted demands from relatives of mobilized personnel that would cap mobilization periods at a year with rotations no less than every three months.[117] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728847461349781572?s=20

ISW cannot confirm that any Russian officials have accepted conditions from relatives to set forth terms for mobilization.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec debuted its new “Chistyulya” portable anti-drone system on November 24.[118] x.com/FAB87F/status/1728848025357869532?s=20

The device reportedly weighs eight kilograms (about 18 pounds) and can suppress drones within a one-kilometer radius.[119] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728848025357869532?s=20

Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) reported that Chinese online retail service AliExpress sells a similar product with almost the same specifications.[120] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728848416107585777?s=20

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children into Russian national and cultural identities.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 23 that the Kremlin instructed occupation authorities to ensure that 70 percent of Ukrainian students in occupied areas participate in educational exchange programs in Russia.[121] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728849045366411442?s=20

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation schools have started efforts aimed at indoctrinating as early as first grade.[122] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728849045366411442?s=20

The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Militia claimed on November 24 that 248 children from occupied Luhansk Oblast returned from a trip to Moscow City that the Kremlin-funded pseudo-volunteer “Movement of the First” youth organization planned.[123] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728849366612398402?s=20

Donetsk (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on November 23 that over 60 students from occupied Donetsk Oblast are currently studying at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), an institute of higher education subordinate to the Russian Foreign Ministry.[124] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728849722729804148?s=20

Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko published footage on November 23 showing Russian military personnel teaching children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast basic military skills at an event in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea.[125] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728850143561097718?s=20

Russian Information Operations and Narratives Nothing significant to report. Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian military leadership reportedly hopes to increase the combat capabilities of Belarusian forces by equipping them with new drones and armored personnel carriers.

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 24 that Belarus’ military leadership will equip Belarusian artillery brigades with Russian-produced “Supercam” S350 drones in early 2024.[126] twitter.com/FAB87F/status/1728850376776941969?s=20

Mashovets stated that Belarusian artillery brigades are currently equipped with quadcopter drones that do not provide adequate fire control and adjustment and that the Russian-produced drones have an increased range.

Mashovets added that Belarusian forces are also testing the Belarusian-produced Volat V2 armored personnel carrier at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground in Borisov, Belarus.

Note: ISW receives no classified material, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports.

References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.